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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESLEY JOHN HARLAN, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs . 
BONNIE KATHLEEN HARLAN, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
: REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
: CASE NO. 990011 - CA 
: PRIORITY NO. 15 
Appellant, BONNIE HARLAN, hereinafter "Ms. Harlan" or 
"Wife", submits the following Reply Brief: 
ARGUMENT 
I. MS. HARLAN DID NOT FAIL TO MARSHAL THE FACTS IN SUPPORT OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WITH REGARD TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING ON HER 60(b) MOTION. 
Mr. Harlan first argues that Ms. Harlan failed to marshal 
the facts that support the trial court's ruling on Ms. Harlan's 
60(b) motion. 
The general rule on appeal is that *[t]o overturn a trial 
court's finding of fact 'an appellant must first marshal all the 
evidence supporting the findings and demonstrate that, even if 
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings."' 
1 
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 186 (Utah App. 
1997) (quoting Coalville City v. Lundaren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 
(Utah App. 1997) (quoting Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 
(Utah 1989)), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah 1997). 
In the present case, neither findings of fact were entered 
in regard to Ms. Harlan's 60(b) motion, nor was there a hearing 
on the motion. Therefore, there was no evidence to marshal in "'.:'. 
support of the absent findings. 
Mr. Harlan also argues that Ms. Harlan "failed to inform .::: 
this Court of her objection's to the court's Ruling where she ~u. 
agreed that there were errors in the addition and debt 
calculations../' (Appellee Brf. P. 11-12). This statement is 
offered without any cite to the record and as an attempt to 
support Mr. Harlan's argument that Ms. Harlan agreed with the 
lowering of the value of the business from the Ruling to the 
Findings drafted by Mr. Harlan. It is axiomatic that "if counsel 
on appeal does not provide citations to the record, we need not 
reach the merits of his or her substantive claims." State v. 
Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Arnica Mut. Ins. 
i 
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App. 1989). Therefore, 
Mr. Harlan's unsupported claims may be ignored on appeal. 
Ms. Harlan, pro se, did argue that the calculations in the 
Ruling valuing the business at $195,735 were in error. 
(Respondent's Response to Ruling, Appellee Apdx. IV). However, 
( 
2 
contrary to Mr. Harlan's allegations, she did not argue that the 
value of the business should be lower. Ms. Harlan specifically 
argued that the net worth of the business should be $279,262. 
(Appellee Apdx. IV, p.2). 
Therefore, Mr. Harlan's argument that Ms. Harlan "agreed" 
with the changes made in valuing the business from the trial 
court's Ruling to the Findings drafted by Mr. Harlan is without 
merit. In addition, as there were no findings entered in regard 
to the trial court's order on Ms. Harlan's 60(b) motion, there 
were no facts to marshal in support of the absent findings. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MS. 
HARLAN'S PRO SE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER. 
First, Mr. Harlan again argues that Ms. Harlan and Mr. 
Drollinger (the C.P.A. who testified at trial as to the business 
valuation) "agreed that the debt amount in the Ruling was not 
correct/' (Appellee Brf. P. 13). This statement is again made 
without any cite to the record or other support and such 
unsupported claims are without merit on appeal. See Ortiz, 782 
P.2d at 962; Arnica, 768 P.2d at 969. As addressed above, Ms. 
Harlan argued in her Response to Ruling that the valuation of the 
business in the Ruling was much lower than as established at 
trial by the evidence. In addition, Mr. Drollinger did not state 
that the debt amount in the Ruling was incorrect. No testimony 
3 
was offered on this issue subsequent to the Ruling being entered. 
"A liberal standard for application of Rule 60(b) in divorce 
cases is justified by the doctrine of continuing jurisdiction 
that a divorce court has over its decrees. Clearly, a court 
should modify a prior decree when the interest of equity and fair 
dealing with the court and the opposing party so require/' Boyce 
v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980). :~~ 
The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a J:--. 
creature of equity designed to relieve 
against harshness of enforcing a judgment, 
which may occur through procedural > 
difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing 
party, or misfortunes which prevent the 
presentation of a claim or defense . . . . 
[ejquity considers factors which may be 
irrelevant in actions at law, such as 
unfairness of a party's conduct, his delay in 
bringing or continuing the action, the 
hardship in granting or denying relief. 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741, 742 
(Utah 1953). 
In addition, *[d]iscretion must be exercised in furtherance of 
justice and the court will incline toward granting relief in a 
doubtful case to the end that the party may have a hearing."' Id. 
(quoting Warren, 260 P.2d at 743 (citation omitted). 
In the present case, Ms. Harlan moved the court to set aside 
the decree because the decree and findings signed by the court, 
and drafted by Mr. Harlan, were drastically different from the 
Ruling entered by the trial court. In the Ruling, the trial 
court awarded Mr. Harlan $197,735 from the marital estate. The 
Ruling awarded Ms. Harlan $176,000, and the net difference in the 
4 
IRA Accounts, $14,176 plus $5,000 for the purchase of a 
reasonable automobile. This totals $195,176, or $2,559 less than 
what was awarded to the Mr, Harlan. 
Mr. Harlan argues in his brief that the trial court used the 
incorrect amount of debt in valuing the business in it Ruling. 
(Appellee Brf. P. 14). This claim by Mr. Harlan is again made 
without any cite to the record. The Ruling used clear and 
precise language and reasoning in valuing the marital estate 
and dividing it nearly equally. 
The Ruling plainly states that *[t]he Court, based upon a 
totality of the evidence, from an examination of the exhibits 
adduced and from the record determines that the value of the 
business is $195,735 and makes the following findings to support 
that conclusion . . . ." The findings submitted by Husband state 
that "[biased on the evidence received by the Court, the Court 
determines the value of that business to be $177,562.05." There 
was no hearing held on the differing Findings offered by both 
parties and, as evidenced by Mr. Harlan's complete lack of any 
cite to the record, there is no record which explains the trial 
court's dismissal of its own Ruling, and the reasoning in support 
thereof, in this matter. Mr. Harlan simply offers, as 
justification for the modification, that *[t]he correct amount of 
debt was $74,737.00." (Appellee Brf. 14). 
It is undisputed that the trial court heard substantial 
5 
testimony and received evidence as to the valuation of the 
business. After hearing all of this testimony and 
considering all of the evidence, the trial court entered 
it's Ruling which unequivocally values the business at 
$195,735. No further testimony was given. No further 
evidence was admitted. However, the value of the business 
was modified by the findings submitted by Mr. Harlan to 
$177,562.05. A hearing should be held to determine why the 
carefully calculated and supported value of the business as 
clearly stated in the trial court's Ruling was modified by 
nearly $20,000 by the findings submitted by Mr. Harlan. 
The changes from the trial court's well-reasoned and 
supported Ruling to the findings and decree can only be 
explained by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. These changes substantially prejudiced Wife and { 
created an unjust and unfair result requiring that the 
decree be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Harlan respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's dismissal < 
of Wife's Motion for Relief from Judgment and remand the 
matter with directions to the trial court to set aside the 
\ 
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decree. A decree should enter in conformity with the actual 
Ruling of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of October, 1999. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, PC 
MAHft/MZ. tfOKPORON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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